Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1953

Mary J. Howard v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. and
Horace Byington : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
D. Howe Moffat; Wendell C. Day; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Howard v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., No. 8030 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2034

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,~
Case No. 8030

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

i

'
t

I,

MARY J. HOWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.RINGSBY TRUCK LINES, INC.
a corporation, and H 0 RACE
BYINGTON,
Defenda!nts and Respondenvs.

f
I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

D. HOWE MOF:FAT
WENDELL C. DAY
Attorneys for Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------------------

1

Statement of Points relied upon for revertsaL..............................

6

Argument ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

CASES CITED
Blaihfield Encyclopedia of Auto Law and Practice, Pa. Ed.
Sec. 787 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
Dennis v. Maher, 197 "rash. 286, 84 Pac. 2nd 1029, (Wash.
1938) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19
Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 Pac. 2nd 1068, (Utah
1939) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------15' & 19
Johnson v. Burnham, 198 'Vash. 500, 88 Pac. 2nd 833, (Wash.
1938) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19
Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Line, 38 Kan. 50, 23 Pac.
2nd 449, (Kan. 1933) -------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Mooney v. Chapdelaine, 11 At. 2nd 713, (N.H.) ------------------------ 18
Morby v. Rogers, 252 Pac. 2nd 231, (Utah 1953) ________________________ 20
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Sec. 479 P. 1253........ 10
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Page 754 ______________________ 12
Smith v. Gould, 110 W.Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53, (W.Va. 1931) .... 14
Watkins v. Utah Poultry, 251 Pac. 2nd 668, (Utah 1952) ........ 10
Williams v. Brown, 181 So. 679, La. App, ____________________________________ 18
24 American Law Reports 1308 ---------------------------------------------------- 12
63 American Law Reports 280........................................................ 12
92 American Law Reports 47 .......................................................... 21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
~\LARY

J. HOWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.Case No. 8030

RINGSBY TRUCK LINES, INC.
a corporation, and H 0 RACE
BYINGTON,

Defendants and Respondents.

BHIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought for the wrongful death of
Francis A. Howard and of Allen Howard, by the wife and
mother, Mary Howard.
Francis A. Howard, the husband, age 41 (R. 157)
and his son, Allen Howard, age 14, on the 19th day of
October, 1951, left Salt Lake City to go deer hunting and
met Lloyd Howard, a brother, his wife and daughter,
at the mouth of Parleys Canyon (R. 57). Frank was
driving a jeep pickup truck (R. 57) he borrowed from
Henry Day of Draper, Utah, his employer, and Allen,
his son, was riding with him. Lloyd Howard, his wife
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and daughter were riding in Lloyd's Studebaker Sedan.
They proceeded to Heber City, then when half way up
Daniels Canyon, they met other brothers repairing a
trailer tire and they stopped and helped ( R. 85). The
other brothers were Ewan, Brady and Ren (R. 86).
From this point Frank started first in the jeep pickup
and was followed by Lloyd, his wife and daughter. A
little further up Daniels Canyon, Lloyd passed Frank.
Just before they arrived at Current Creek on Highway
40 (R. 87), Lloyd stopped to look at some deer and F'rank
and his son stopped also (R. 87). The last time Lloyd
saw Frank's pickup truck was just before they got to
Fruitland when he saw him through the rear vision
mirror. Lloyd drove on Highway 40 to the Junction of
the Tabiona Road where he turned North on the Tabiona
Road, drove over Fruitland Bench and stopped to wait
for Frank (R. 88). Frank, with his son, proceeded along
Highway 40 and came down the hill to cross the Red
Creek Bridge (R. 29) (R. 55) (R. 90) (R. 115) (R. 121);
there the jeep pickup hit the Southeast corner of the
bridge and proceeded across the highway and collided,
on approximately the North edge of the oiled surface of
the road, at a point 225 feet East of the bridge (R. 32),
with a truck driven by Defendant Byington and operated
by Defendant Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.
At the scene of the accident there is a road running
to the South and a relatively level area to the North
side of the highway designed to allow West bound vehicles to turn into the road running south. The Ringsby
Truck, driven by the Defendant Byington and operated
2
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by the Defendant Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., apparently
ran over the jeep pickup truck, then it proceeded across
the turn out area to the North of the highway and finally
collided with some large boulders 135 feet from the point
of in1pact, (R. 34), and cmne to a stop. The jeep pickup
truck had been knocked North and West some 86 feet
from the point of impact when it started to burn, it came
to rest approximately 15 feet to the rear of the Ringsby
truck.
The Rings by truck was powered by a 300 horse
power diesel engine in a 1951 l(enworth tandem axle
tractor and was pulling a Fruehauf stainless steel trailer
35 feet in length. The entire unit was 53 feet 6 inches in
length. It had been loaded at Grand Island, Nebraska,
with explosives, and the gross weight of the truck, trailer
and cargo was 60,900 pounds. Apparently, Defendant
Byington, the driver of the Ringsby Truck, and his relief
driver, who was riding in the sleeper part of the truck,
abandoned the two vehicles immediately after the colliswn.
Yernon A. Williams and Stanley Sutherland, driving
easterly along the highway, came upon the truck and
burning pickup, stopped, found a man's body projecting
from the burning pickup, then noticed a sign "Explosives" on the Rings by truck (R. 13, 14 and 15) and then
drove their car to the East around the corner of the
mountain and stopped. Williams flagged the West
bound traffic and Sutherland went West across Red
Creek and flagged the East bound traffic ( R. 19'). Floyd
Hartman, driving West along Highway 40 for the pur-
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pose of hunting South along Red Creek came to the
stopped cars, was told there was a truck of explosives
about to explode. He went down along the side of the
dugway (R. 72, 73 and 74) and found that the Ringsby
truck load of explosives was not on fire and probably
would not get on fire. He inspected the wreck heard a
moaning sound and found Allen Howard some 10 or 12
feet East of the jeep pickup truck, his breathing in a
pool of blood making the noise (R. 75). He endeavored
to clean up Allen Howard, took him in his arms, ran up
the highway and pursuaded three unknown boys to take
Allen to Duchesne, which they did. Allen died shortly
after arrival (R. 77). Hartman then started the traffic
moving West and Glen Wing, a Radio Technician for
the State Highway Patrol, was in the traffic on the West
side of Red Creek. Wing went down to the scene of the
accident, helped put out the fire, and removed the body of
Francis A. Howard. Defendant Byington, the driver of
the Ringsby truck told Wing at that time that his speed
was 45 miles per hour as he was going West approaching
the Red Creek Bridge and he said, according to Mr. \Ving
that "He observed this pickup truck as it hit the abutment of the bridge and then continued on down the highway and that is the last he saw of it (R. 29)."Wing says
he didn't ask the driver how fast the pickup truck was
going. There was no evidence, on either the oiled portion
of the road East of the point of impact or on the graveled
portion of the turn-out indicating the application of
brakes before the impact (R. 40). Byington, the Ringsby
truck driver, apparently told a lot of people that the
4
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pickup truck hit the Southeast abutment of the bridge.
Each of the witnesses quoted him differently. Lloyd
Howard said that the driver told him, "He saw the jeep
hit the bridge. He didn't see it again" (R. 90). He told
Brady, however, "It looked like it hit the corner of the
bridge and went out of control and it cut across, crosswise, across the road and he didn't see it any more until
he felt the impact." (R. 115). He told Dale Howard,
"He saw the jeep truck hit the bridge; he figured it hit
the bridge and it came across the road until it hit his
truck." (R. 21).
The truck of the Defendant was coming down a 6%
grade and the jeep pickup fron1 the point of hitting the
bridge to the point of impact was going up a 6% grade
(R. 130). All of the stopping distance prior to the point
of ilnpact would have been upon the hard surface part
of the road. Most of the stopping distance after the impact would have been upon gravel (R. 139). The brakes
of the truck at the time would not have been heated but
would have been cold (R.142). Taking into consideration
the speed of 45 miles per hour and assuming that all of
the stopping could have been accomplished on gravel, the
truck could have been stopped in 130 feet, (R. 148) and
including a reaction time of 34 of a second it could have
been stopped in 180 feet.

~~

~!'

]t

The Defendants moved the Court to dismiss the First
Cause of Action on the grounds that the evidence conelusively showed, as a matter of law, that Francis A.
Howard was negligent in being on the wrong side of the
highway and there was no evidence that Defendant By5
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ington was negligent and also moved to dismiss the
Second Cause of Action on the grounds that as a matter
of law there was no act or conduct of Byington which was
the legal cause of the accident, resulting in the death of
Allen Howard (R. 168-169). The Court granted both
motions (R. 170).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
FOR REVERSAL
I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION.

A. At the moment that the jeep pickup truck, being
driven by Frank Howard struck the Southeast corner of
the Red Creek bridge, which Defendant Byington saw at
the time it happened, Byington ought to have realized the
danger in which F'rank Howard was placed and there
was sufficient time before the collision so that Byington,
by the exercise of reasonable care and by the use of the
instrumentalities under his control and under the conditions then existing, could have avoided the accident.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION.

A. When Byington saw the pickup jeep in which
Allen Howard was riding strike the Southeast corner of
the Red Creek bridge he should have realized the danger
in which Allen Howard was placed and thereafter Byington had ample time, by the exercise of reasonable care,
and by the use of the instrumentalities under his control,
and under the conditions then existing, to have avoided
the accident.
III.

THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FIND-
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INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER.
~\.. Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact concerning
the First Cause of Action is erroneous in that the court
finds that the Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to prove the Defendant was gulity of any negligence which approxi1nately caused the collision and subsequent death of Francis A. Howard.

B. Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact concerning
the Second Cause of Action is erroneous in that it finds
that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that
the Defendants were guilty of any negligence whatsoever
which approximately caused the collision and subsequent
death of Allen Howard.
C. That the Judgment is erroneous wherein it ordered, adjudged and decreed that the First and Second
Cause of Action be disrnissed upon the merits and with
prejudice.

1

ARGUMENT
Frank Howard, an automobile mechanic, driving a
jeep four wheel drive pickup truck in an Easterly direction on Highway 40 on October 19, 1951, with a son,
Allen, age 1-1, as his passenger, in the exercise of due and
reasonable care under all of the circumstances, struck
the Southeast corner of Red Creek bridge, throwing the
jeep pickup truck out of control (R.. 184) which caused
the pickup truck to travel across the highway into the
path of Defendant's oncoming vehicle.
Defendant's truck at said time was traveling at 45
mph. The evidence does not disclose the speed of the jeep
pickup truck nor does it disclose the reason for the jeep
pickup truck hitting the Southeast corner of the bridge.
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The fact is that the jeep pickup did hit the corner of tht
bridge and was thrown out of control, which fact was discovered at the time it occurred by the Defendant. Thereafter the jeep traveled 225 feet across the highway to the
North shoulder where it was literally run over by Defendant's truck.
The evidence does not disclose how far East of the
point of impact the Defendant's truck was at the time
the driver, Byington, saw the jeep pickup hit the bridge.
The following table might be helpful on this question:
(a) Jeep moving at 40 mph. travels 58.7 feet per
second. Travels 225 feet in 2.84 seconds.
(b) Jeep moving at 45 mph. travels 66 feet per

second. Travels 225 feet in 3.41 seconds.
(c) Jeep moving at 50 mph. travels 73.3 feet per
second. Travels 225 feet in 3.7 seconds.
(d) Jeep moving 60 mph. travels 88 feet per
second. Travels 225 feet in 2.56 seconds.
The testimony is undisputed that the truck speed
was 45 mph., and we assume that is a reasonable speed
and the driver of the jeep, in the absence of any other
testimony, was driving at a reasonable speed, which for
the purpose of this argument would be 45 mph., and we
further assume that neither the jeep or the truck reduced
their speed up to the place of impact, this being the most
favorable assumption to sustain the trial court's rulings,
then the truck was 450 feet from the bridge and 225 feet
from the point of impact at the time that the driver discovered the danger in which the two deceased subjects
of this lawsuit were placed by the collision with the

8
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bridge. If we further assuine a % second reaction time,
for the driver of the truck, before acting, this being the
only testhnony on the subject (R. 149), the driver, after
the reaction ti1ue, was still 384lf2 feet from the bridge or
159.5 feet from the point of impact. The only testimony
on stopping distance is that of Dr. F'rank Y. Harris, who
testified that after taking into consideration the G%
down grade on which the truck was traveling and the fact
that part of the travel was on oil and part on gravel,
and assuming that the co-efficient of friction for the
truck was that of gravel for the entire distance, this assumption again being most favorable to Defendant, still
the truck could have been stopped in 130 feet (R. 148).
There is no evidence that the truck applied its brakes
at any time (See statement of counsel R. 131), or attempted to change its course or do anything to avoid colliding with the jeep pickup truck. It hit the jeep with
such force that it actually threw it 86 feet (R. 26), then
traveled on a distance of 135 feet (R. 26), to collide with
some big boulders and did extensive damage to the truck
as a result of the impact with the boulders. (See exhibits
24, 25, 26 and 27).
Byington's legal responsibilities as he came West on
Highway 40 approaching the Red Creek bridge were,
1.

To keep a look-out for other users of the highway,

2.

To have his truck under such control that he
could, by the exercise of reasonable care
avoid doing harm to other users of the road,
and
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

To so drive the truck that at all times he
could, as a reasonable man, steer or stop the
vehicle so as to avoid harm to others.

~.,his Court has had occasion, many times, to pass
upon what has generally come to be known of as the "last
clear chance doctrine", in

Watkins v. Utah Poultry, 251 Pac. 2d 668,
Utah 1952.
This court approved of

Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2,
Sec. 479, P. 1253
as follows:
"S. 479.

Defendant's Last Clear Chance.

"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's
subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the
harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the
exercise of reasonable vigilance and care,
and
(b) the defendant
(i)

knows of the plaintiff's situation
and realizes the helpless peril involved therein; or

(ii)

knows of the plaintiff's situation
and has reason to realize the peril
involved therein; or

(iii)

would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the

10
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vigilance which it was his duty to
the plaintiff to exercise, and
(e) thereafter is neligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and cornpetence
hi~ then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."
The situation presented to Byington was a jeep pickup truck striking the Southeast abutment at the end of the
100 foot long narrow ( :.W feet wide) Red Creek Bridge
and going out of control. Byington at the moment of the
impact between the pickup truck and the bridge was discharging his legal responsibilities, to-wit, he saw the
pickup hit the bridge, he was driving his truck at a
reasonable rate of speed (45 In ph.). There is nothing
in the evidence which would indicate he did not have his
truck under control so that he could have steered or
stopped the truck and thereby have avoided doing harm
to the occupants of the jeep pickup truck. At that moment Byington was driving upon a relatively narrow oil
road, down a 6% grade, and could have stopped, including his reaction time, in 180 feet. He didn't stop. There
is some evidence from which the jury could find that
from the time of the impact of the jeep with the bridge
to the tilne of the collision between the jeep pickup and
the Rings by truck, Byington failed to keep any kind of
a lookout. As a matter of fact, one witness quotes Byington as saying he did not see the jeep pickup from the
time of the collision with the bridge to the time the jeep
collided with his truck (R. 29). The evidence is rather
clear that he did not reduce the speed of his vehicle and
although Byington was under the obligation of operating
11
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his vehicle upon the right half of the road, 44-6-54, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, that obligation is relative and as
stated in
Vol. 2, Restatement of the Law of Torts Page
754
"Thus a statute or ordinance requiring all
persons to drive on the right side of the road may
be construed as subject to an exception permitting
travelers to drive on the other side, if so doing
is likely to prevent rather than cause the accidents, which is the purpose of the statute or ordinance to prevent."
See also
24 A. L. R. 1308
63 A. L. R. 280
The evidence is undisputed that the collision between the
jeep pickup and the Ringsby truck involved bringing the
jeep pickup in contact with the right front half of the
Ringsby truck and the point of impact was on the North
edge of the hard surface portion of the road. The jury
could have found the fact to be that Byington, had he
kept a proper lookout and had he kept his truck under
proper control, could have avoided the collision by doing
either of two things, either by turning his truck a matter
of three or four feet to the left, and avoided colliding
with the jeep pickup, or stopping or even reducing his
speed and have avoided running over the jeep pickup
with 61000 pounds of steel and explosives.
The court by its findings and by its granting the
Motions to Dismiss in effect has said there is no evidence
from which the jury might find the Defendant negligent,
12
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which in effect is another \vay of saying that the law is
that when a person traveling upon the highways sees an
approaching vehicle go out of control that he has no obligation to. stop or to so steer his vehicle as to avoid colliding with the vehicle out of control. This is exactly
what driver Byington did in the instant case. His negligence consists of omissions, in not watching the course
of the jeep pickup after it collided with the bridge, in
not reducing the speed of his truck so that he could have
stopped had the jeep pickup come within the path of the
Ringsby truck, and when he saw the jeep pickup crossing
the highway in front of his vehicle in not steering his
vehicle to the left and avoiding the collision.
The court having found the fact to be that the jeep
pickup "went out of control" when it hit the Southeast
corner of the Red Creek bridge (See Finding No. 5,
First Cause of Action R. 174, Finding No. 4, Second
Cause of Action R. 175) found a fact which was undisputed in the testimony and certainly a fact which the
jury would be justified in finding had the trial court
allowed the case to go to the jury.
A presumption of due care attended Francis Howard,
at least up to the time that his jeep pickup hit the bridge.
There being no evidence as to what caused the jeep to hit
the bridge, it is pure speculation whether it was caused
by the negligence of Francis Howard or as the result
of an unavoidable accident, such as a blown out tire or
mechanical failure of the steering apparatus.
It is Plaintiff's contention that at the time the
Howard pickup jeep struck the bridge, which was seen

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by Byington, he was, as a matter of law, alerted to the
potential danger in which the Howards were placed and
that he had a continuing responsibility to watch the course
of the jeep, bring his truck under such control that he
could have stopped or steered his vehicle and avoided
colliding with the rampaging jeep. This principle of law
is laid down in the case of
Smith v. Gould, 110 ,V. Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53
W.Va. 1931
where Plaintiff's decedent alighted from a bus on the
right-hand side of the road, walked back along the side
of the road to the rear of the bus, where she started to
cross the street and was struck by Defendant's car. The
highway was straight at the point of collision. :Mrs. Smith
the decedent, did not look to her right, the direction
from which the Defendant was coming. The Defendant
saw someone alight from the bus when he was about 600
feet from it but he did not watch the person and did not
again see the decedent until he was too close to her to
avoid striking her, although he could have stopped his
car in approximately its length. The court affirmed a
verdict for the Plaintiff and among other things said,
"We think it is a sound principle that the last
clear chance doctrine is properly extended to a
case where an automobilist, by reason of failure
by him in his plain duty to maintain a lookout for
the persons and property of others on the highway, commensurate with the danger indicated by
attendant facts and surrounding circumstances
known to him, and which are such as to have put
him on the alert, causes injury to a pedestrian
(though such pedestrian was himself concurrently

14
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negligent), where the peril should have been seen
and cmnprehended by the automobilist and the
injury a voided in the exercise of reasonable care
coiniueusurate with the situation. Such case constitutes an exception to the general rule which
precludes reeovery by a plaintiff whose negligence
has concurred with the defendant's."
See also
Leinbach L'. Pidcu·ick Greyhound Line, 38
Kan. 50, 23 Pac. 2d -±-±9, Kan. 1933.
The court had a situation smnewhat similar to the
case at bar before it in the case of
Farrell L Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 Pac. 2d
1068, Utah 1939.
where the Plaintiff, a passenger in the Cayias car sued
the Defendant for personal injuries resulting from a
collision between the Cayias car and the Defendant. The
evidence was that the Defendant observed the Cayias
car when more than 100 feet away, to have been partially
on his left-hand side of the highway (the right hand side
for the Defendant) and under those facts the court found
there was ample time and roon1 for the Defendant to
have turned to the right and avoided the collision. Judge
Wade stated:
"But the serious question in this case is
whether the defendant was negligent in failing to
turn his car slightly to his right and thereby avoid
a collision. * * *
"The defendant could see the on-coming car;
could see that if both cars continued in their
course there would be a collision. Then the mere
fact that the approaching car continued in its
15
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course without making any move to turn was sufficient to warn the defendant that the driver of the
on-coming car did not intend to turn and that it
was his duty to make the turn before it was too
late.
"On this point, in Saw v. Wilcox, Mo . .App.
224 S. W. 58, 59, in discussing this question the
court said: 'It may be that each of the parties
approached too near the other '"' * * before making
any move to avert a collision. Certainly one of the
parties did so. The Plaintiff's driver says that
he was driving about 15 miles per hour, and without slackening his speed came squarely toward
and in the pathway of defendant's car till he was
within 15 to 20 feet of same, before turning to go
round him. It was, however, primarily defendant's duty to seasonably turn to the right and clear
the way; but, when plaintiff saw he was not doing
this, he should have put his car under control, and
not waited till it was too late to turn aside.'
"It is our opinion that every driver who is
taking reasonable care in driving his car will not
stop to consider for even a mon1ent whether the
other driver is on his side of the road or not,
where, as here, he has ample time and space to
do so, but will move over and not take a chance,
and avoid a collision. .A driver who refuses to
turn and a void a collision under those circumstances, simply because he was on his right-hand
side of the road, and the approaching car was
slightly on its left-hand side of the road, would
certainly be guilty of negligence. It is true that
there was always a chance, up until it was too late
for the defendant to turn, that the driver of the
approaching car would make the turn slightly
to the right and avoid a collision, and it is also
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true that the driver of the approaching car, being
on the wrong side of the road, had a greater duty
to make this turn than did the defendant. But
where, as in this case, the defendant had ample
time and space to make the turn, the turn required being so slight that it could not in any way
place defendant in danger or even inconvenience
hiin, an.d where the risk of collision was fraught
with such great possibilities of harm, not only to
the defendant himself but also the driver of the
approaching automobile and the other occupants
thereof, the court was arnply justified in finding
the defendant was guilty of negligence.
"And unless there is something out of the
ordinary it would be impossible to say that the
approaching car would not tU:rn to its proper
side of the road, and it would never be safe for
the car on its right-hand side of the road to turn
to its left-hand side, because its driver could not
be sure that the driver of the approaching car on
the wrong side of the road would not turn to its
right side of the road.
"On the other hand, there are many authorities, and we have found none to the contrary,
which hold that where an automobile which is being driven on its right-hand side of the street is
approaching another automobile which is being
driven in the opposite direction and on its lefthand or wrong side of the street, it is the duty of
the driver who is on the right-hand side of the
street to use reasonable care to avoid a collision,
even if the approaching car is being driven, in violation of the law of the road, on the wrong side
of the street.
"In Berry on Automobiles, 6th Ed., 842, Sec.
995, it is said: 'A motorist on the right side of
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the road must exercise reasonable care to avoid
a collision with a car on the wrong side.'"
Other cases to the same effect
Mooney v. Cha,pdelaine, 11 At. 2d 713, N.H.
wherein
Blashfield Encyclorwdia of Auto Law & Practice, Pa. Ed. Hec. 787
is quoted as follows :
"Whether it is the duty of a driver on the
right side of the road seeing an auto approach on
the wrong side of the road to stop to avoid a collision cannot ordinarily be detern1ined as a matter
of law. The driver who is on the right side may
assurne on the first appearance of the other vehicle, that it will change its course, and the particular point of time when he is no longer warranted in indulging in such assumption it is for
the jury in an action for injuries resulting from
a collision."
See also
Williams

1J.

Brown, 181 So. 679, La. App.

Assuming negligence on the part of Francis A. Howard, which the jury might have found proximately contributed to his death, the jury still, upon the evidence
presented, should have had the opportunity of passing
on the question, as to whether the Defendants had a last
clear chance to have avoided the collision resulting in
Francis A. Howard's death, and if they should have so
found, that there was such a last clear chance they eould
have found for the Plaintiff on her First Cause of Action.
Upon the Second Cause of Action, the one for the
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death of Allen Howard, there is no contention that he
was in any way negligent: so the ~econd Cause of Action
is squarely within the holding in
Farrell v. Cameron, Supra.
As a practical 1natter, the sole question before the
court on this appeal is whether or not the Defendant was
negligent, the court having found in its Findings of F'act
that the Defendant was not negligent. The guest cases
by this fact are made authorities for reversal in this case.
In the case of
De'WYllis v. Jlaher, 197 Wash. 286, 84 Pac. 2d
1029, Wash. 1938.

a passenger in a bus which collided with a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction upon the bus's right-hand
side of the highway, sued for injuries. From an adverse
decision the Plaintiff appealed and the court said,
"It is sufficient to state that the question of
whether or not the stage was proceeding at an exeessive and unlawful rate of speed and whether
the stage driver exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances in applying his brakes and in
not pulling off the highway to the shoulder of the
road, and if either such affirmative action or failure so to act were the proximate cause of the collision, presented questions to the jury."
See also
Johnson v. Burnham, 198 Wash. 500, 88 Pac.
2d 833, Wash. 1938.
where there was a head-on collision between two vehicles
upon a narrow bridge, wherein the court had the following to say:
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"(2)

In the case of Luther v. Pacific Fruit

& Produce Co., 143 Wash. 308, 255 P. 365, 367, this

court said: 'One driving an automobile along a
public highway, who sees a car approaching on the
wrong side of the road, has a right to assume that
the driver thereof will observe the law of the road
and seasonably turn over to the right, and he
may proceed upon this assumption until he sees,
or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to see,
that his assumption is unwarranted. When the
appellant became aware, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have become aware, that an accident was imminent, he was bound to look out for
himself and to exercise the care of a prudent man
for the purpose of avoiding an accident.' "
l\1:any of the physical facts in the case at bar are similar to those in the case of
llforby v. Rogers, 252 Pac. 2d 231, l'tah 1953.
where the court said,
"Reasonable minds, however, would be justified in inferring negligence on the part of defendant from circumstantial physical facts also
brought out in the record. For example the lack
of skid or brake marks would justify an inference
against defendant's purported 'quick action' to
avoid the accident. The final position of the automobile in the canal would justify a finding that
defendant was traveling faster than his testimony
indicated and that such speed indicated his lack of
control over the automobile at the time of the
accident. Furthermore, the testimony in regard
to the boy's injuries would justify a finding that
the deceased was struck with great force and was
not just 'tipped over' as defendant and his wife
testified. The fact that extent of injury to the
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bicyrle consisted of a darnaged rear mud guard
and there wa8 no injury to the front of the bicycle
would justify a finding that the boy did not turn
into defendant as wa~ contended, but was rather
struck fr01n behind. ln addition to this reasonable
minds could find from the point of impact and the
position of deceased's body, that the boy had not
made any sudden turn but had gradually veered
over onto the west portion of the highway before
he was struck."
Applying the facts in the case at bar we can say the lack
of brake or skidding marks would justify an inference
that Defendant failed to do anything to avoid the accident. The final position of the truck, the distance of
travel and the damage done to it when it collided with
the boulder will justify a finding that the Defendant was
traveling faster than his statement to the witnesses indicated and that such speed indicated loss of control
over the truck at the time of the accident. In the case at
bar there is no doubt that the jeep pickup was hit with
great force and violence. In addition to the fact the jeep
pickup hit the right-hand half of the Ringsby truck would
justify the jury in finding that if the Defendant Byington had been keeping a proper lookout and had turned
his truck slightly, a 1natter of 4 or 5 feet to his left, or
the South side of the highway, that he would have avoided the collision.
The editors of American Law Reports have a very
extensive annotation on the last clear chance doctrine,
92 A. L. R. 47
The editor's conclusion after 100 pages of annotation is
stated in the following language:
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"The courts are practically agreed that the
doctrine applies upon the assumption that the
defendant actually discovered, and in the circumstances ought to have realized, the danger in time
by the exercise of reasonable care, by the use of
the instrumentalities then under his control and
under the conditions then existing, to avert the
accident, even though the defendant's conduct is
properly characterized merely as negligence."
It is admitted by all concerned that the Defendant
actually discovered the hazardous condition in which the
two deceased members of the Howard family found themselves. This danger was discovered by the Defendant
Byington in time so that by the exercise of reasonable
care and by the use of the instrumentalities then under
his control and under the conditions then existing he
could have averted the accident. It is submitted that the
court should have allowed the matter to go to the jury
and accordingly the court erred in granting Defendant's
1notions and entering its Findings of Fact and Judgment.
It is respectfully prayed that the Judgment be reversed,
and the matter returned to the trial court for new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
D. HOWE MOF FAT
WENDELL C. DAY
Attorneys for Appell(J;nts.
1
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